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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression is treated as one of the essential foundations of
democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the
development of every man.1 It is guaranteed by the art. 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in 19482, the art. 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
adopted in 19663, the art. IV of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American State in 19484,
the art. 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights adopted by the nations
of the Americas in 19695, the art. 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights adopted in 1981, the art. 10 of European Convention on Human Rights
signed in 1950.
The subject of the chapter will be borders of the freedom of expression in
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (hereinafter
“Tribunal”) concerning the art. 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights
(hereinafter “European Convention” or “Convention”). The Tribunal is entitled to
examine application against European states – members of the European
Convention on Human Rights. This Convention has the most important influence
on standards of human rights protection in European countries, because of the
right of the Court to control if provisions of the European Convention was not
infringed by states.
According to the art. 10 paragraph 1 of the Convention:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
In jurisprudence of the Tribunal freedom of expression is treated very
widely. It is not only freedom of oral or written statements but also freedom to
communicate with others in other ways, for example by some gesture, painting.
To recognize real extend of the freedom we should remember about the
limits of the freedom. According to the art. 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention the
1
 Judgment Handyside versus the United Kingdom, application number 5493/72. Judgments of the Tribunal can be
found in Hudoc. It is the Tribunal’s database, accessible by internet: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
2
 According to the art. 19 of the Universal Declaration „Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
3
 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16th December 1966, and in force from 23th March 1976.
4
 According to the art. IV of the American Declaration „Every person has the right to freedom of investigation, of
opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever”.  According to the art. 13 of
the American Convention „Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice”. According to the art. 9 of the African Charter
5
 „1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 2. Every individual shall have the right to express
and disseminate his opinions within the law.”
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limits should be: prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society and in the
interests of  goods stipulated in this article. They are:
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.
The freedom of expression in public matters may be in conflict with all of
these goods. Especially the reputation of others very often constitutes a border of
political critique. It is very difficult to find a solution of the kind of conflict and to
decide which good, the freedom of expression or the reputation of others, is more
important in the concrete situation. Therefore the analysis of the issue in the
jurisprudence of the Tribunal needs to present circumstances of the cases.
1.  LINGENS VERSUS AUSTRIA
One of the most famous jurisdiction of the Tribunal regarding the issue
was judgment delivered on 8th July 1986 in the case Lingens versus Austria
(application no. 9815/82). On October 1975 in the course of a television interview,
Mr. Wiesenthal, who was President of the Jewish Documentation Centre, accused
Mr. Peter, the President of the Austrian Liberal Party that he had served in the first
SS infantry brigade during the Second World War. This unit had on several
occasions massacred civilians. Mr. Peter stated that he was a member of the unit,
but he was never involved in the atrocities. Mr. Wiesenthal then said that he had
not alleged anything of the sort. Being questioned on television about these
accusations against Mr Peter, Mr. Kreisky, the Chancellor and President of the
Austrian Socialist Party supported him and referred to Mr. Wiesenthal’s
organization and activities as a “political mafia” and “mafia methods”. As reaction
to this event Mr Lingens published two articles.
The first one related in particular the activities of the first SS infantry
brigade. It also concentrated on Mr. Peter’s role in criminal proceedings against
persons who had fought in that SS brigade. The author concluded that although
Mr. Peter was admittedly entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence,
his past nevertheless rendered him “unacceptable as a politician” in Austria. Mr
Lingens also criticized Mr. Kreisky who protected, in his opinion, Mr. Peter and
other former members of the SS for political reasons.
In the second article Mr Lingens again criticized Mr Kreisky for supporting
Mr. Peter and his attitude towards former Nazis. He also claimed Austria for
ignoring her history and not coming in terms with its past. In his opinion this
policy risked delivering the country into the hands of a future fascist movement.
He added that: “In truth Mr. Kreisky’s behavior cannot be criticized on rational
grounds but only on irrational grounds: it is immoral, undignified”. The author
stated that Austrians could reconcile themselves with the past without seeking the
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favors of the former Nazis.
The Chancellor brought two private prosecutions against Mr. Lingens.
He considered that certain passages in the articles summarized above were
defamatory and relied on the art. 111 of the Austrian Criminal Code. The Vienna
Regional Court found Mr. Lingens guilty of defamation for having used the
expressions “the basest opportunism”, “immoral” and “undignified”. However, it
held that certain other expressions were not defamatory in their context (“minimum
requirement of political ethics”, “monstrosity”). It fined him 20,000 Schillings.
The court considered as mitigating circumstances the fact that the accused intended
to voice political criticism of politicians on political questions and that the latter
were expected to show greater tolerance of defamation than other individuals. In
view of the defendant’s good faith it awarded Mr. Kreisky no damages but, on his
application, ordered the confiscation of the articles complained of and the
publication of the judgment.
Both sides appealed against the judgment. The Court of Appeal set the
judgment aside without examining the merits, on the ground that the Regional
Court had failed to go sufficiently into the question whether the then Chancellor
was entitled to bring a private prosecution. The Vienna Regional Court came to
the conclusion that he had been criticized not in his official capacity but as a head
of a party and as a private individual who felt himself under an obligation to
protect a third person. It followed therefore that he was entitled to bring a private
prosecution. The Regional Court passed the same sentence as in the original
judgment.
Both sides again appealed to the Vienna Court of Appeal, which confirmed
the Regional Court’s judgment and reduced the fine imposed on the applicant.
However, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the art. 111 of the Criminal Code
applied solely to the esteem enjoyed by a person in his social setting. In the case
of politicians, this was public opinion. Frequent use of insults in political discussion
had given the impression that statements in this field could not be judged by the
same criteria as those relating to private life. Politicians should therefore show
greater tolerance. As a general rule, political critique did not affect a person’s
reputation unless they touched on his private life. That did not apply in the instant
case to the expressions “minimum requirement of political ethics” and
“monstrosity”. Mr. Kreisky’s appeal was therefore dismissed.
Mr. Lingens lodged an application against the judgment before the
European Court of Human Rights. In his opinion the decision infringed his freedom
of expression to a degree incompatible with the fundamental principles of a
democratic society. The Tribunal stated that it was not disputed that there was
“interference by public authority” with the exercise of the applicant’s freedom of
expression. The question was if the interference contravenes the Convention. The
Tribunal had to determine whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, had
an aim that is legitimate under the art. 10 paragraph 2 and whether the interference
was “necessary in a democratic society” for the aim.
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The Tribunal declared that the conviction, based on the art. 111 of the
Austrian Criminal Code, was accordingly “prescribed by law” and had a legitimate
aim under the art. 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention. Therefore the Tribunal
concentrated on the question whether the interference was “necessary in a
democratic society” for achieving the aim. The adjective “necessary” implies the
existence of a “pressing social need”. The Tribunal underline that Contracting
States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need
exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the
legislation and the decisions applying it.
In this case the Tribunal decided that the interference with Mr. Lingens’
exercise of the freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society
for the protection of the reputation of others. It was also disproportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. There was accordingly a breach of the art. 10 of the
Convention. In justification of the judgment the Tribunal recalled that:
freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and
for each individual’s self-fulfillment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is
applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favorably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but
also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
“democratic society.
The Tribunal also underlined that these principles are of particular
importance as far as the press is concerned. It is incumbent on the press to impart
information and ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of public
interest, but the press must not overstep the bounds set for the “protection of the
reputation of others”.
Freedom of the press furthermore affords the public one of the best means
of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political
leaders. More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of
the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the
Convention.
With regard to acceptable critique of politician the Tribunal stated that it
is wider than critique of private individual. A politician “inevitably and knowingly
lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists
and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of
tolerance.” The art. 10 of the Convention protects reputation of all individuals but
the requirements of such protection have to be weighed in relation to the interests
of open discussion of political issues.
According to the Tribunal the expressions (“basest opportunism”,
“immoral” and “undignified”), used by Mr. Lingens apropos of Mr. Kreisky, dealt
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with political issues of public interest in Austria. It had given rise to many heated
discussions concerning the attitude of Austrians to National Socialism and to the
participation of former Nazis in the governance of the country. The Tribunal agreed
that the use of the aforementioned expressions in particular appeared likely to
harm Mr. Kreisky’s reputation, but content and tone of the articles were fairly
balanced. It is also important to see the background against which these articles
were written. It was shortly after the general election that causes always political
controversy. As the Vienna Regional Court noted in its judgment in this struggle
each used the weapons at his disposal and these were in no way unusual.
The Tribunal underline that at issue was not Mr. Lingens’s right to
disseminate information but his freedom of opinion and his right to impart ideas.
The relevant Austrian courts sought to determine whether the defendant had
established the truth of his statements. This was in pursuance of the art. 111 of the
Austrian Criminal Code. With regard to this the Tribunal made distinction between
facts and value-judgments. The truth of value-judgments is not susceptible of proof.
The facts on which Mr. Lingens founded his value-judgment were undisputed.
Under Austrian law journalists cannot escape conviction unless they can prove
the truth of their statements. As regards value-judgments this requirement is
impossible of fulfillment and it infringes freedom of opinion, which is secured by
the art. 10 of the Convention.
2.  OBERSCHLICK VERSUS AUSTRIA
The next very important judgment of the Tribunal which concerned the
issue was delivered on 23th May 1991 in the case of Oberschlick versus Austria
(application no. 11662/85). Mr. Oberschlick and other persons laid a criminal
information against Mr. Grabher-Meyer. He was a Secretary General of one of the
political parties which participated in the governing coalition in Austria. During
the parliamentary election campaign Mr. Walter Grabher-Meyer had suggested
that the family allowances for Austrian women should be increased by 50% in
order to obviate their seeking abortions for financial reasons, whilst those paid to
immigrant mothers should be reduced to 50% of their current levels. He had justified
his proposals by saying that immigrant families were placed in a discriminatory
position in other European countries as well.
The full text of the information was published by Mr. Oberschlick in a
review Forum. The cover page of the review’s issue contained a summary of its
contents, including the title : “Criminal information against the Liberal Party
Secretary General”. This information contained suspicion of commitment of: the
misdemeanour of incitement to hatred, the misdemeanour of incitement to commit
criminal offences and expressing approval of criminal offences, the offence of
activities within the meaning of provisions on the prohibition of the National
Socialist Party (NSDAP). The information contained also justification of the
suspicion.
Mr. Grabher-Meyer brought a private prosecution for defamation against
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the applicant and the other authors of the criminal information. The Vienna Regi-
onal Criminal Court decided to order the discontinuance of the proceedings, because
the publication  did not constitute the criminal offence defined in the art. 111 of
the Criminal Code. The case concerned value-judgments on behavior which had
been correctly described. The Vienna Court of Appeal quashed the above decision.
It held that for the average reader the publication must have created the impression
that a contemptible attitude was ascribed to Mr Grabher-Meyer. The court
underlined that authors insinuated motives which Mr. Grabher-Meyer had not
himself expressed, in particular by alleging that he had been guided by National
Socialist attitudes.
In the next proceeding before the Regional Court the applicant was
convicted of defamation again. The Court of Appeal did not depart from this
decision. Mr Oberschlick lodged the application against the judgment before the
European Court of Human Rights.
Mr Oberschlick alleged that his conviction for defamation and the other
related court judgments had breached his right to freedom of expression. It was
“interference” with his right to freedom of expression, which was “prescribed by
law” and was aimed at protecting the “reputation or rights of others” within the
meaning of the art. 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention. In the applicant’s opinion
the interference was not “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve that aim.
In a democratic society the role of periodicals is to comment on politicians’
social or legal policy proposals. The Austrian courts had denied him the right of
giving his opinion as to whether the proposal constituted a revival of National
Socialism. According to the Austrian Government, Mr. Oberschlick had
overstepped the limits of justifiable and reasonable criticism. He had not been
able to prove his accusation. The Government also added that the European Court
should respect the margin of appreciation to be left to the national authorities
which are better placed than the international judge to determine what matters
should be regarded as defamatory. It depends on national conceptions and legal
culture.
Examining violation of the art. 10 of the Convention, Tribunal recalls the
meaning of freedom of expression. “It is applicable not only to “information” or
“ideas” that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.” Underlining the role
of the free press the Tribunal added that it affords the public one of the best means
of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas.
In the Tribunal’s opinion the criminal information published in the Forum
contributed to a public debate on a political question of general importance. The
issue of different treatment of nationals and foreigners in the social field had given
rise to discussion not only in Austria but also in other member States of the Council
of Europe. The proposals of Mr. Grabher-Meyer were likely to shock many people.
That is why Mr. Oberschlick criticism was published in a provocative manner.
It should be recalled that the reason of conviction of Mr. Oberschlick was
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that he had failed to prove his allegations. In this context the Tribunal held that the
criminal information published in the Forum contained the facts and the analysis
of the Mr. Grabher-Meyer’s statements. The part reporting politician’s statements
was factually correct. The letter part of the information was regarded by the Tri-
bunal as a value-judgment. It expressed the opinion of the author about the proposal
made by Mr. Grabher-Meyer. Consequently the Tribunal stated that as regards
value-judgments requirement of proving its truth it is impossible to fulfill. Therefore
it constitutes an infringement of freedom of opinion.
The form of the publication was very important too. The Tribunal marked
that Austrian courts did not establish that the form of a criminal information was
misleading in the sense that a significant number of the readers were led to believe
that a public prosecution had been instituted against Mr. Grabher-Meyer or even
that he had already been convicted. That is why Mr. Oberschlick cannot be said to
have exceeded the limits of freedom of expression by choosing this particular
form. In conclusion the Tribunal declared that the interference with Mr
Oberschlick’s exercise of his freedom of expression was not “necessary in a
democratic society ... for the protection of the reputation ... of others”.
3. CASTELLS VERSUS SPAIN
As a decision of the Tribunal having meaning for the issue of political
critique it have to be mentioned the judgment delivered on 23 th April 1992 in the
case Castells versus Spain (application no.11798/85). Mr. Castells was a senator
supporting independence for the Basque Country. He published in some weekly
magazine an article concerning murders on political grounds which were not
investigated in a correct way. He accused the government of this situation, especially
the right-wing parties who were in power.
He accused that perpetrators of these crimes continue to work and remain
in posts of responsibility. No warrant has been issued for their arrest. Any other
endeavor had been taken to reveal the truth about the murders. He also presented
situation of persons who were ETA members. Thousands of persons, suspected of
being members of ETA,  have been detained in police stations. Mr. Castells stated
that in the Basque Country nothing has changed has far as impunity and questions
of liability are concerned. In his opinion fascist associations engaged in the attacks
against Basques had not any independent existence, outside the State apparatus.
In 1979 the prosecuting authorities instituted criminal proceedings against
Mr Castells for insulting the Government. The Supreme Court, requested the Senate
to withdraw the applicant’s parliamentary immunity. In 1981 the Supreme Court
charged Mr. Castells with having proffered serious insults against the Government
and civil servants. During the proceeding the Supreme Court refused to admit the
majority of the evidence put forward by the defence. They were intended to show
the truth of the information disseminated by Mr. Castells. He lodged an appeal.
The Supreme Court confirmed its decision and it stated that the accuracy of the
information was not decisive for a charge of insulting the Government. In 1983
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the Supreme Court gave the judgment. It sentenced Mr. Castells to imprisonment.
He was also disqualified for one year from holding any public office and exercising
a profession. Mr Castells lodged an appeal. He complained that he had not been
able to have the Supreme Court’s judgment examined by a higher court and of the
length of the proceedings. He again offered to prove the truth of his statements. In
1985 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal.
Mr. Castells lodged the application against the judgment before the
European Court of Human Rights. According to his submission the criminal
proceedings brought against him, and his subsequent conviction for insulting the
Government, interfered with his freedom of expression.
The Tribunal recalled that  freedom of expression, enshrined in paragraph
1 of the art. 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress. The freedom is especially important
for an elected representative of the people. His task is to draw attention to their
preoccupations and defends their interests. It is important especially for an
opposition member of parliament, like Mr. Castells. Although he did not express
his opinion from the senate floor, he might have done without fear of sanctions,
but chose to do so in a periodical. He did not loose his right to criticize the
Government.
The Tribunal also underlined the role of the press.
Although it must not overstep various bounds set, inter alia, for the
prevention of disorder and the protection of the reputation of others, it is
nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on political
questions and on other matters of public interest.
The pursue of Mr. Castells’ article was to denounce the Tribunal impunity
enjoyed  perpetrators of numerous attacks in the Basque Country since 1977. He
thereby recounted facts of great interest to the public opinion of this region. In his
view the Government was responsible for the situation. Assessing his accusation
the Tribunal pointed that
limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government
than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician. In a democratic
system the actions or omissions of the Government must be subject to the
close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also
of the press and public opinion. Furthermore, the dominant position which
the Government occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint in
resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are
available for replying to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its
adversaries or the media. Nevertheless it remains open to the competent
State authorities to adopt, in their capacity as guarantors of public order,
measures, even of a criminal law nature, intended to react appropriately
and without excess to defamatory accusations devoid of foundation or
formulated in bad faith.
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The Tribunal emphasized that Mr. Castells offered to prove the truth of
his statements, but the Supreme Court declared such evidence inadmissible, because
the defence of the truth could not be pleaded in respect of insults directed at the
institutions of the nation. According to the Tribunal many of applicant’s assertions
were susceptible to establish their truth, but the Supreme Court prevented him
from demonstrating his good faith. Therefore the Tribunal considered such an
interference in the exercise of Mr. Castells’ freedom of expression as unnecessary
in a democratic society.
4. INCAL VERSUS TURKEY
The limits of political critique was the subject of the judgment of the
Tribunal delivered on 9th June 1998 in the case Ical versus Turkey (application
no. 22678/93). Mr. Incal was a Turkish national, a member of the executive
committee of the Ýzmir section of the People’s Labour Party (“the HEP”).
In 1992 the executive committee decided to distribute in the Ýzmir a
leaflet. It contained critique of the measures taken by the local authorities against
small-scale illegal trading and the sprawl of squatters’ camps around the city. In
the text the authors stated that it was a part of a campaign against the Kurdish
population. The first stage was the operation [against] street traders, stallkeepers
and mussel sellers. The aim of this operation was to impose an ‘economic blockade’
mainly on Kurdish, fellow citizens who make their living through these activities,
condemning them to destitution and starvation. This caused to racist and anti-
Kurdish attitudes. In this way the masses were to be frightened, oppressed and
compelled to return to their province of origin. According to the leaflet the second
prong of the compaign was ‘Operation shantytown’. The same combination of
prefecture, security police and town hall launched the demolition of the squatters’
camps. The authors claimed that the demolitions, which began in Yamanlar will
soon spread to Ýzmir’s other shantytowns. It was s part of the special war against
the Kurdish people. The leaflet was ended by the appeal: “We call on all Kurdish
and Turkish democratic patriots to assume their responsibilities and oppose this
special war being waged against the proletarian people.”  The public prosecutor
instituted criminal proceedings in the National Security Court against the authors
of the leaflet. In 1993  the Court found Mr. Incal guilty of the offences charged.
The applicant and the other convicted persons appealed to the Court of Cassation.
The Court decided that it was not necessary to hold a hearing.
Mr. Incal lodged an application against the judgment before the European
Court of Human Right. He submitted that his conviction had infringed his freedom
of expression.   Assessing the case the Tribunal underlined the meaning of freedom
of expression in democracy. This freedom is particularly important for political
parties and their active members, because they represent their electorate. They
role is to defend their interests. The closest scrutiny is needed for the interferences
with the freedom of expression of a member of an opposition party, like Mr. Incal.
The Tribunal underlined that “its task is not to take the place of the
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competent domestic courts but rather to review under the art. 10 the decisions
they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation.” On the other site the
Tribunal noted that the relevant passages in the leaflet criticized certain measures
taken by the authorities. The appeal aimed to the population of Kurdish origin,
urging them to band together to raise certain political demands. “Although the
reference to “neighbourhood committees” appears unclear, those appeals cannot,
however, if read in the context, be taken as incitement to the use of violence,
hostility or hatred between citizens.”
  Assessing if the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the
Tribunal underlined that the freedom of political debate is not absolute. A
Contracting State may make it subject to certain “restrictions” or “penalties”, but
the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in
relation to a private citizen, or even a politician.
Furthermore, the dominant position which the government occupies makes
it necessary for it to display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings,
particularly where other means are available for replying to the unjustified
attacks and criticisms of its adversaries. Nevertheless it remains open to
the competent State authorities to adopt, in their capacity as guarantors of
public order, measures, even of a criminal-law nature, intended to react
appropriately and without excess to such remarks.
The Tribunal stated that the interference of authorities was very radical.
The executive committee of the HEP submitted a copy of the leaflet to the Ýzmir
prefecture with an application for permission to distribute it. The authorities could
require changes to the text. However the leaflets were seized and there was brought
prosecutions against its authors.
During proceeding before the Tribunal the representatives of Turkish
Government asserted  that “it was apparent from the wording of the leaflets …
that they were intended to foment an insurrection by one ethnic group against the
State authorities”. It had therefore been the State’s “duty to forestall any attempt
to promote terrorist activities by means of incitement to hatred”, given that “the
interest in combating and crushing terrorism takes precedence in a democratic
society”. Taking those arguments into consideration the Tribunal stated that it
does not discern anything which would warrant the conclusion that Mr Incal was
in any way responsible for the problems of terrorism in Ýzmir. It pointed out that
the Prevention of Terrorism Act was not applied in the case by the National Security
Court. Therefore the  Tribunal assessed that Mr. Incal’s conviction was
disproportionate to the aim pursued, and it was unnecessary in a democratic society.
5.  OBERSCHLICK VERSUS AUSTRIA (NO. 2)
Judgment delivered on 1 th July 1997 in the case Oberschlick versus
Austria (no. 2) (application no. 20834/92) is also very important for the subject of
limits political critique. In 1990 on the occasion of a “peace celebration”, leader
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of the Austrian Freedom Party and Governor of the Land of Carinthia, Mr. Haider
gave a speech glorifying soldiers who had taken part in the Second World War. In
his opinion people should not differentiate between good and bad soldiers. All of
them, even German soldiers, had fought for peace and freedom. He also said that
“freedom of expression reaches its limits where people lay claim to that spiritual
freedom they would never have got if others had not risked their lives for them so
that they may now live in democracy and freedom.”
Mr. Oberschlick, an Austrian writer published in Forum Haider’s speech
and commented: “Idiot instead of `Nazi”. He also noted that being called a Nazi is
an advantage to Jörg Haider. He explained his opinion adding that Mr. Haider is
an idiot because he excluded the vast majority of Austrians from any exercise of
freedom as they did not have the legitimising good fortune to have risked their
lives “in the uniform of honour of the Third Reich for the Hitlerian freedom to
wage wars of conquest and impose the final solution”.
In 1991 Mr. Haider brought an action for defamation and insult against
Mr. Oberschlick. The court found the applicant guilty of having insulted Mr. Haider.
In the court’s view, the word “Trottel” (English – “Idiot”) was an insult and it
could never be used for any objective criticism.
Mr. Oberschlick lodged an appeal against that judgment, but the Vienna
Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Courts judgment. It noted that only those
who had read Mr Haider’s speech and the comments accompanying would
understand why Mr. Oberschlick used the word “idiot”. Mr. Oberschlick lodged
an application against the judgment before the European Court of Human Rights.
The Tribunal recalled fragments of its prior judgments concerning the
issue of wider range of freedom of expression in political matters and critique of
politicians. The conviction of Mr. Oberschlick interfered his freedom and this
interference was prescribed by law. Its purpose – protection the reputation of others
- was one of the purposes stipulated in the art. 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention.
The problem that needed to be resolved was if the interference was “necessary in
a democratic society”.
In Mr. Oberschlick’s opinion the word “Idiot” was used to draw public
attention to how  outrageous, illogical and dangerous the arguments in Mr Haider’s
speech were. The word “Idiot” was against what Mr. Haider had said not against
him. On the other hand, in the government’s opinion the word used by Mr.
Oberschlick was nothing but an insult that broke basic rules in public life.
Probing the case the Tribunal pointed that the judicial decisions taken by
Austrian courts should be considered in the light of the whole article of Mr.
Oberschlick and the circumstances in which it was written. Mr. Haider’s speech
was provocative and it was intended to arouse strong reactions. The article published
in Forum contained the speech of Mr. Haider, the critique of Mr. Oberschlick and
the explanation of word used against Mr. Haider. The reason of the critique was
exclusion people who was not soldiers from enjoying any freedom of opinion.
 According to the Tribunal the word “Idiot” was polemical but it did not
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constitute a personal attack. It was a part of political discussion provoked by Mr.
Haider’ speech. The truth of the word is not susceptible to proof. Although the
word “Idiot” may offend but it was not disproportionate to the indignation aroused
by Mr. Haider. The article 10 of the Convention protects not only the ideas and
information, but also the form in which they were conveyed. The Tribunal declared
that the interference in the freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic
society.
6.  KRASULYA VERSUS RUSSIA
The problem of the margin of appreciation in the cases of limits of freedom
of political critique was brought in the judgment of the Tribunal delivered on 22th
February 2007 in the case of Krasulya versus Russia (application no. 12365/03).
Mr. Krasulya was the editor-in-chief of a regional newspaper “Noviy Grazhdanskiy
Mir”. In 2001 there was published an article about a decision of the town legislature
connected with the procedure of appointment of the town’s mayor. The author of
the article was Mr. Krasulya, who was also competitor of Mr. Chernogorov in
former the election. The critique of the decision was connected with the fact that
the procedure of appointment was no longer made by towns residents but by town’s
legislature. According to the author of the article the decision was taken under
pressure of Mr. Chernogorov.
In 2002 the prosecutor’s office of the Stavropol Region initiated criminal
proceedings against the applicant. The court found the applicant guilty of
defamation. Mr. Krasuly appealed against the conviction, but the court
upheld the judgment.
According to the Tribunal it is important to determine if the interference
with the applicant’s right was necessary in a democratic society.
The test of necessity in a democratic society requires the Court to deter-
mine whether the “interference” complained of corresponded to a “pressing
social need”, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued
and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it were
relevant and sufficient. In assessing whether such a “need” exists and
what measures should be adopted to deal with it, the national authorities
are left a certain margin of appreciation. This power of appreciation is not
however unlimited, but goes hand in hand with a European supervision
by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether a restriction
is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.
The Court’s task in exercising its supervisory function is not to take the
place of the national authorities, but rather to review under Article 10, in
the light of the case as a whole, the decisions they have taken pursuant to
their margin of appreciation.
Considering this problem many circumstances have to be taken into
account many elements, for example the position of the applicant, the position of
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the person against whom his criticism was directed, the subject matter of the
publication, characterization of the contested statement by the domestic courts,
the wording used by the applicant, and the penalty imposed on him.
The author was a journalist and therefore it have to be underlined the role
of the press in ensuring the proper functioning of political democracy. He criticized
a politician in respect of whom the limits of acceptable criticism are wider than in
the case of a private individual. The subject matter of the article was the decision
of the town legislature to abolish mayoral elections in the regional capital. The
author also disqualified the governor’s managerial abilities. It was a very important
problem for regional community and the article was a part of  an on-going political
debate.
In the Tribunal’s view, the applicant’s statement about Mr. Chernogorov’s
influence on the legislators’ decision was too imprecise to constitute an accusation
of bribery. The author stated that Mr. Chernogorov took a part in the legislative
session. The governor and his advisors lobbied the legislators for the decision.
According to the Tribunal it is undisputed that the governor attended the session
and endeavored to persuade the lawmakers to vote for a law abolishing mayoral
elections in the town. Therefore, the Court considered that Mr. Krasulya published
a fair comment on an important matter of public interest.
Additionally some of the author’s statements was not about facts but it
constituted his opinion. Therefore the  requirement to prove their truth was
impossible to fulfill and infringed Mr Krasulya’s freedom of opinion.
The Tribunal declared that the article did not exceed the acceptable limits
of criticism. The  domestic courts overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation
afforded to them for restrictions on debates of public interest. The article was
strongly worded, but it did not resort to offensive form. It did not go beyond the
acceptable degree of exaggeration or provocation. The interference with Mr.
Krasulya freedom was disproportionate to the aim pursued and not “necessary in
a democratic society”. Additionally the Tribunal considered that the penalty was
disproportionately severe. It had a chilling effect on the applicant by restricting
his journalistic freedom and reducing his ability to impart information and ideas
on matters of public interest.
7.  KITA VERSUS POLAND
The limits of political critique regarding representatives of local authorities
was a subject of the judgment delivered on 8th of July 2008 in the case Kita versus
Poland (application no. 57659/00). The applicant wrote an article concerning
alleged financial irregularities in the municipality and distributed it in the form of
leaflets. His article was entitled: “Information Bulletin: What the president of the
City Council and the City Council Board have to hide”. He stated that they don’t
have time to administer the municipal educational funds properly, because they
had been so busy interfering with the employment policies of the local schools.
Therefore teachers and employers of the municipal educational institutions had
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not received money for protective clothing which under relevant legal provisions
they should have received. Some allowance was not paid to the physical education
teachers too. When Mr. Kita informed about the problem the mayors and the
president of the City Council Board, he had been dismissed from his post. In his
opinion the teachers did not claim this allowance because they had been afraid to
lose their jobs. Furthermore although the municipality had received subsidies from
the State to provide transport for children to schools, the schools had been required
to pay an additional contribution to the municipality. Mr Kita added that he was
not surprised that one of the people, mentioned in his article, had not replied to an
inquiry from the Supreme Control Chamber as the municipal budget surplus had
probably been used to pay bonuses and per diem allowances for the council
members. He encouraged the readers of the leaflet to reconsider if these people
can be offered yet another term of office in the next elections.
On October 1998 the Kielce Regional Court ordered the applicant to
publish in the local newspaper an apology and a statement that he had included
untrue information in his leaflet. It further ordered the applicant to pay a fine of
1,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) for the benefit of the Childrens Hospital in Kielce. Mr
Kita lodged an appeal. The Cracow Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance
decision because the applicant had not been able to defend himself in person and
accordingly the proceedings had been invalid. On November 1998 the Kielce
Regional Court gave again a decision. The court ordered the same and only the
fine was reduced. According to the Court the article contained statements which
lacked any factual basis. In addition, it could have caused the fact that politicians
mentioned in the article had received fewer votes, because the applicant had
deliberately distributed the leaflet during the election campaign. Mr Kita lodged
an appeal again. The Court of Appeal found that the decision of the Regional
Court was correct. The Court explained that the applicants untrue statements could
not be considered as part of “acceptable criticism” within the meaning of Article
10 of the Convention. Proceedings provided for under section 72 of the Local
Elections Act were aimed at ensuring the proper conduct of the electoral campaign
by preventing infringements of the personal rights of those standing for election.
During the proceeding before the Tribunal the Government claimed that
the applicant had failed to prove the correctness and accuracy of his statements.
He had also overstepped the limits of political, because he had defamed several
local politicians during a very sensitive period just before the elections. In the
government’s opinion the courts had not exceeded the margin of appreciation
available to them in assessing the need for such interference. According to the
applicant he had been deprived of his right to freedom of expression. The courts
had not examined the evidence submitted by him. Moreover his statements had
been made in the public interest and during a political debate.
According to the Tribunal the interference was prescribed by law, pursued
the legitimate aim of protection of the reputation or rights of others and the problem
which needed an examination was if the interference was necessary in a democratic
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society. The Tribunal recalled his judgments that declare that freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. This freedom
is subject to exceptions, but they must be interpreted strictly. The Tribunal
underlined that he must look at the impugned interference in the light of the case
as a whole. It is important to take into an account the content of the statements
concerned, the context in which they were made and also the particular
circumstances of those involved.
  Mr Kita distributed the leaflet in the course of an ongoing election
campaign. He aimed to criticize the president and named members of the City
Council Board. The Tribunal underlined that public authorities and their
representatives are exposed to the permanent scrutiny of citizens.
 According to the Tribunal “the Polish courts unreservedly qualified all
of them as statements which lacked any factual basis without examining the
question whether they could be considered to be value judgments”. In his opinion
some of the statements of the applicant could be considered as statements which
lacked a sufficient factual basis, but some of them could reasonably be considered
value judgments. The applicant’s article was formed as a part of a debate on matters
of public interest. He acted in good faith.
In any event, the Court (the Tribunal – added by the author) would obser-
ve that the distinction between statements of fact and value judgments is
of less significance in a case such as the present, where the impugned
statements were made in the course of a lively political debate at local
level, and where the members of the community should enjoy a wide
freedom to criticize the actions of a local authority, even where the
statements made may lack a clear basis in fact. 6
The courts had failed to recognize that the case involved a conflict between
the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of others.
They did not gave into an account that the limits of acceptable criticism of the
members of the City Council Board were wider. The Tribunal emphasized that
there were not any passages of the applicant’s in the courts’ decisions. They had
only considered the general meaning of his article.
The decisions of the Kielce Regional Court and the Krakow Court of
Appeal were given some time after the local elections, so they could have
discontinued the proceedings, especially as the parties had at their disposal the
possibility of issuing ordinary civil proceedings against the applicant.
Finally the Tribunal concluded that Mr Kita did not exceed the acceptable
limits of criticism. The small fine that applicant was ordered to pay did not detract
from the fact that the standards applied by the courts were not compatible with the
principles embodied in Article 10 of the Convention. There were not “relevant
and sufficient” reasons justifying the interference at issue.
6
 The Tribunal recalled also the judgment delivered on 24th April 2007 in the case Lombardo and Others versus
Malta, application no. 7333/06).
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CONCLUSIONS
 All of the presented judgments show that according to the Tribunal the
solution of the conflict of the freedom of expression and the reputation of others
depends on many circumstances of the cases. Therefore it is impossible to point at
the limits of political critique in an abstractive way. The extend of the freedom
depends on the author of the expression (word, gesture etc.), the addressee, the
matter it concerns, the object of critique – its position, its behavior (provocative
or not), other circumstances which may arise in concrete cases. The Tribunal
considered also if the reaction (penalty imposed on an application) was proportional.
Too severe reaction could be treated as infringement of the art. 10 of the Convention.
It is also important to remember about the margin of appreciation afforded to
domestic courts. This power is not unlimited and the task of the Tribunal is to
assess if a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression.
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